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Note
Expanding the Role of Trade Preference
Programs
Monica Patel∗
“[N]ations that trade with each other do not go to war.”1 A
developed country that assists developing countries with international trade and economic growth creates benefits for both
sides. However, many developing countries face difficulty when
it comes to economic growth. The Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program’s goal is to help developing countries’
economies grow by providing “temporary preferential advantages”2 in which developed countries lower the custom duties
on goods imported from qualified developing countries.3 Given
all of the history and text regarding the program,4 one would
think it would get adequate attention and resources. On the
contrary, the U.S. GSP program only has, on average, two em∗ J.D. Candidate 2011, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2007,
University of California, Berkeley. I would like to thank Professor Gregory
Shaffer for his insight and suggestions; the Editors and Staff of the Minnesota
Law Review, especially Emily Gleiss, Joe Hansen, and Wendy Lisman; and my
family and friends for their support and encouragement. Copyright © 2011 by
Monica Patel.
1. Rafael Leal-Arcas, The European Union and New Leading Powers:
Towards Partnership in Strategic Trade Policy Areas, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J.
345, 346 (2009) (“Trade creates economic ties and generates more prosperity;
thus it contributes to peace and security, since nations that trade with each
other do not go to war.”).
2. Generalized System of Preferences Renewal Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-573, § 501(b), 98 Stat. 3018, 3018.
3. See SEC’Y-GEN., ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND
DEVELOPMENT, THE GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES: REVIEW OF THE
FIRST DECADE 9 (1982) (“The solution proposed was the creation of a system of
non-reciprocal preferences, under which the developed countries would lower the
custom duties they assessed on goods imported from developing countries.”); Information on Countries Eligible for GSP, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/ATT%20(A)%20-%20090417%20GSP_BDC
.pdf (last visited Mar. 4, 2011) (listing the eligible countries).
4. See infra Part I.A (discussing the Most-Favoured Nation (MFN) rule,
which initially precluded the possibility of giving trade benefits to developing
countries until the global community gradually accepted the idea).
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ployees.5 With such lofty and demanding responsibilities, the
two GSP employees leave late on a daily basis due to the immense workload.6 At times, their efforts push countries, like
Afghanistan, to export just one more product, such as dried
apricots.7 Yet GSP celebrates seemingly small results because
it means one more exporter will utilize the program’s duty-free
treatment.8 Though based on great intentions, GSP’s attempt
to increase exports from developing countries barely produces
any significant increase in trade or, more importantly, economic growth for developing countries and the global economy.9
In the late 1960s, many members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) first expressed the need for trade preference
programs.10 These members realized that more needed to be
done to industrialize developing countries,11 typically low- and
middle-income countries.12 Trade preference programs lower
5. Telephone Interview with Marideth Sandler, Exec. Dir., GSP Program, Office of U.S. Trade Representative (Dec. 28, 2009).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Kevin Moss, Note, The Consequences of the WTO Appellate Body Decision in EC—Tariff Preferences for the African Growth Opportunity Act and
Sub-Saharan Africa, 38 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 665, 671 (2006) (“[T]he overall impact of the last thirty years of preferential treatment for developing
countries has been meager. Developing countries have increased their share of
world merchandise trade from twenty percent in 1973 to only twenty-eight
percent twenty-five years later.”).
10. See Gregory Shaffer & Yvonne Apea, Institutional Choice in the GSP
Case: Who Decides the Conditions for Trade Preferences?, 39 J. WORLD TRADE
977, 979 (2005).
11. See Cosmas Milton Obote Ochieng, The EU–ACP Economic Partnership Agreements and the ‘Development Question’: Constraints and Opportunities Posed by Article XXIV and Special and Differential Treatment Provisions
of the WTO, 10 J. INT’L ECON. L. 363, 374 –75 (2007) (stating that General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) members recognized that different
strategies were necessary for trade rules based on a country’s level of development); see also Marley S. Weiss, International Labor and Employment Law:
From Periphery to Core, 25 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 487, 499 (2010) (suggesting that trade preference programs are important since they have helped encourage better workers’ rights in developing countries).
12. See How We Classify Countries, WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank
.org/about/country-classifications (last visited Mar. 4, 2011); see also Who Are
the Developing Countries in the WTO?, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop_e/devel_e/d1who_e.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2011). See generally
JONATHAN E. SANFORD & ANJULA SANDHU, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:
DEFINITIONS, CONCEPTS AND COMPARISONS, at vii (2003) (explaining that a
country may be designated “developing” on the basis of per capita income, economic and social structure, social conditions, or the prevailing level of economic and political freedom).
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trade barriers and open opportunities in consumer-driven markets which, in turn, increases trade and economic growth.13
Thus, the programs reduce the cost of exporting goods for participating developing countries by providing duty-free treatment that allows exporters in the developing countries to more
easily compete in developed countries’ markets.14 Because existing trade principles in the WTO prohibit differential treatment, the WTO drafted the Enabling Clause in the WTO
Agreement to allow developed countries to establish trade preference programs.15 Unfortunately, the ensuing programs simply have not done enough to aid developing countries, and thus
achieve the desired increase in trade for all countries.16 Though
preference programs produce some results,17 they barely provide meaningful achievement for developing countries18 because the programs are limited in scope.19 The programs typically offer duty-free treatment for products that are not feasibly

13. See TRACY MURRAY, TRADE PREFERENCES FOR DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 147 (1977) (finding that developing countries have “high production costs, . . . less frequent transportation services . . . and less effective marketing and distribution channels”); SEC’Y-GEN., supra note 3, at 9 (stating that
“preferential tariff rates in the markets of developed countries could provide
impetus for the industrial development of the Third World,” allowing them to
“overcome difficulties . . . arising from high initial costs”).
14. See MURRAY, supra note 13, at 147.
15. See Lorand Bartels, The WTO Enabling Clause and Positive Conditionality in the European Community’s GSP Program, 6 J. INT’L ECON. L. 507,
509 (2003).
16. Compare Moss, supra note 9, at 671 (explaining that developing countries’ share of world trade has increased only slightly and concluding that “the
overall impact of the last thirty years has been meager”), with SEC’Y-GEN., supra note 3, at 10 (noting that the “objectives of the system would be: (a) to increase developing countries’ export earnings; (b) to promote their industrialisation; and (c) to accelerate their rates of economic growth”).
17. See SEC’Y-GEN., supra note 3, at 12 (“From 1976 to 1980 . . . . [t]he
positive influence of the GSP on the evolution of imports from developing
countries can be seen from the fact that imports benefiting from GSP treatment grew over the period at an average rate of nearly 27 per cent per year.”).
18. See MURRAY, supra note 13, at 149 (“G.S.P. benefits represent only 1
per cent of total developing-country exports to the preference-giving countries.”); Moss, supra note 9, at 671 (stating that the impact of preferential
treatment for developing countries is weak).
19. See Moss, supra note 9, at 671–72 (“The GSP has fallen short of expectations largely because benefit-granting countries have failed to include meaningful preferential treatment in the areas of production most important to the
economic development of beneficiary countries, namely textiles, apparel, and
agriculture.”).
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profitable without taking into consideration the large initial
costs of export preparation.20
This Note argues that the existing trade preference programs do not effectively help developing countries increase
their share in trade or economic growth. Part I sets forth the
WTO’s recognition of the need for trade preference programs,
the resulting laws, and the potential flaws in the current strategies. Part II argues that mismatched product coverage, the
short-term nature and unreliability of the programs, and exportation obstacles that are unique to developing countries hinder
the effectiveness of trade preference programs. Part III suggests that the United States modify its trade preference programs to maximize efficiency by more actively seeking out and
easing the export process for qualified developing countries.
Based on participant observation and an interview with the
GSP Program Executive Director, this Note proposes that the
success of the GSP program depends on the interrelationship
between the GSP office and the developing country. Only when
the GSP office assumes responsibility as an agent for the developing country will this program truly aid these countries and,
in turn, the global economy.
I. THE EFFECT OF TRADE PREFERENCE PROGRAMS ON
EXISTING LAW AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
This Part examines the development of and history behind
trade preference programs. It looks both at the impetus behind
the programs’ formation and whether current programs effectively accomplish their stated goals. An examination of the history behind trade preference programs reveals that these programs were formulated to correct economic imbalances that
hinder the economic success of developing countries.
A. JUSTIFYING TRADE PREFERENCE PROGRAMS WITHIN
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW AND PRINCIPLES
The WTO is an organization that produces rules and
agreements that govern the trading relationship of its members
(which consists of 153 countries and amounts to about ninetyseven percent of international trade).21 Accordingly, a country
20. See infra Parts II.A, II.C.
21. Members and Observers, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/
english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2011); The
World Trade Organization in Brief, WORLD TRADE ORG. (2009), http://www.wto
.org/english/res_e/doload_e/inbr_e.pdf.
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cannot establish a program that grants preferential treatment
to a select few without conflicting with international trade law
and the WTO Agreement.22 Nonetheless, the idea behind trade
preference programs eventually gained sufficient support in the
WTO for inclusion within the WTO Agreement.23
A fundamental WTO principle is that the world economy
benefits most when WTO members trade freely with each other
based on supply and demand, rather than on noneconomic interests.24 Countries should prioritize market efficiency over
economic protectionism through trade barriers.25 In 1947, the
WTO Agreement legalized this principle under the MostFavoured Nation (MFN) rule, which requires a WTO member
to offer, immediately and unconditionally, any advantage or
privilege regarding custom duties for imports and exports given
to the like product for all other contracting parties.26 In other
words, the MFN rule prohibits WTO members from providing
benefits solely to developing countries.27
Gradually, however, the idea of granting Special and Differential Treatment (S&DT)28 to developing countries, based on

22. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. I, Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
23. See infra notes 35, 37 and accompanying text.
24. See Gillian Moon, Trade and Equality: A Relationship to Discover, 12
J. INT’L ECON. L. 617, 620 (2009) (“If products are to flow freely between countries, which is necessary if the benefits of the efficiency model are to be realized, demand for them must be based on price and quality, while country of
origin must, by and large, be irrelevant.”).
25. Id. at 619 (arguing that the WTO prohibits unequal treatment because individual governments tend to favor their own industries).
26. GATT, supra note 22, art. I (stating that the MFN rule, “[w]ith respect
to customs duties” related to imports and exports, is that “any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product
originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately
and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties”); see also Moon, supra note 24, at 619–
20 (noting that products of WTO-member countries get most favorable treatment from member countries and that “[i]f a WTO member country makes a
distinction, such as setting a lower tariff for a product from one country, the
like product of other WTO-member countries will immediately and unconditionally become entitled to that lower tariff ”).
27. See Bartels, supra note 15, at 514 (“[T]rade concessions can have the
effect of undermining the WTO rights of other Members.”).
28. See Moon, supra note 24, at 618 (stating that despite MFN, “WTO law
includes roughly 150 provisions known as Special and Differential Treatment
(S&DT), which purposively treat members unequally by granting developing
countries’ products especially favorable treatment in trade”).
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exceptional circumstances,29 formed from the idea that trade is
not equal between nations who are at different levels of industrialization.30 The WTO preamble states that members should
assist developing countries to “secure a share in the growth of
international trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development.”31 In 1971, the WTO granted a waiver,
based on the exceptional circumstances standard in Article IX
of the WTO Agreement,32 to create a trade preference program.33 Though the WTO does not define “exceptional circumstances,” it found an “exceptional situation” because the Andean nations needed “to expand their trade and economics” and
granted the United States a waiver for the Andean Trade Preferences Act (ATPA).34 Thus, the WTO grants waivers to estab29. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization
art. IX, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement].
30. See Ochieng, supra note 11, at 374 (stating that developing countries
emphasized the “different stages of development” to pave the way for the concept of S&DT and the creation of the Enabling Clause); see also Patricia Michelle Lenaghan, Trade Negotiations or Trade Capitulations: An African Experience, 17 LA RAZA L.J. 117, 117 (2006) (arguing that MFN did “not take into
account existing inequality in economic structures as well as levels of development between developed and developing (less developed) countries” and that
trade preferences were expected to overcome these disadvantages); Omar T.
Mohammedi, International Trade and Investment in Algeria: An Overview, 18
MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 375, 395 (2010) (stating that developing countries believed “their markets were too small to support the development of manufacturing industries”); John I. Huhs, Note, Trade Preferences for Developing
Countries: Options for Ordering International Economic and Political Relations, 20 STAN. L. REV. 1150, 1164 (1968) (calling GATT a “rich man’s club”
(quoting S. DELL, TRADE BLOCS AND COMMON MARKETS 244 n.4 (1963))).
31. PETER GALLAGHER, GUIDE TO THE WTO AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
22 (2000); see also GATT, supra note 22, pmbl. (“Being desirous of contributing
to these objectives by entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers
to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international
commerce . . . .”).
32. See Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 29, art. IX; see also Daniel Marinberg, Note, GATT/WTO Waivers: “Exceptional Circumstances” as Applied to
the Lomé Waiver, 19 B.U. INT’L L.J. 129, 130 (2001) (“Article IX of the WTO
Agreement provide[s] for a waiver of the obligations . . . in cases of exceptional
circumstances.”).
33. Generalized System of Preferences, L/3545 (June 25, 1971), GATT
B.I.S.D. (18th Supp.) at 24 (1972); see also Bartels, supra note 15, at 511 (stating that GSP needs a waiver “to enable developed countries to grant preferences to developing countries without also granting the same preferences” to
all other member countries); Moss, supra note 9, at 669 (commenting that in
1971 the WTO waived MFN obligations for ten years).
34. Marinberg, supra note 32, at 150–51. Some commentators suggest
that the WTO will not grant a waiver to remedy economic injury alone or to
achieve a situation that could be accomplished though other methods. Id. at
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lish trade preference programs that bypass the MFN rule as
one way to respond to the need for S&DT.35
Another method became available when, in the Tokyo
Round of trade negotiations in 1979, the WTO members created
the Enabling Clause,36 which allows WTO members to provide
S&DT through trade preference programs.37 Therefore, developed countries may grant preferences without violating the
MFN rule and without the need for a waiver.38 The Enabling
Clause, as a voluntary regime, has subsequently been construed as providing for generalized, nonreciprocal, and nondiscriminatory preferences.39

133 (“If the request did not appear to contain truly urgent policy objectives or
sought objectives that could have been achieved through other methods consistent with the GATT obligations, even though posing increased difficulties to
the requesting party, the waiver was not likely to be granted.”); id. at 143
(classifying exceptional circumstances into eight factors: hardship, harm that
is not only economic, single or very limited group of affected nations, prolonged
arrangement or restrictions, serious injury to an entire domestic industry, absence of alternatives, possibility of eliminating GATT-inconsistent measures,
and lack of precedent). Note that most current waivers deal with attempts to
conform with the Harmonized System, thus limiting any precedential comparison. See id. at 146.
35. See Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 29, art. IX.
36. See Moss, supra note 9, at 670.
37. Differential and More Favourable Treatment Reciprocity and Fuller
Participation of Developing Countries, L/4903 (Nov. 28, 1979), GATT B.I.S.D.
(26th Supp.) at 203 (1980) [hereinafter Enabling Clause], available at http://
www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/tokyo_enabling_e.pdf (“[C]ontracting parties may accord differential and more favourable treatment to developing
countries, without according such treatment to other contracting parties
. . . [where] [p]referential tariff treatment [is] accorded by developed contracting parties to products originating in developing countries in accordance with
the Generalized System of Preferences . . . .”); see also Bartels, supra note 15,
at 513 (noting that the Enabling Clause has been construed to allow developed
countries to give differential treatment on a voluntary basis); Moss, supra note
9, at 670 (“The Enabling Clause also goes beyond the limits of the 1971 Waiver
Decision, permitting preferential treatment for developing countries . . . .”).
38. See also Huhs, supra note 30, at 1162 (finding additional support that
the Enabling Clause was legal via Article XXIV’s grant of permission for the
creation of custom unions and free trade agreements, which shows that sometimes increasing trade with specific countries improves the overall welfare
without hurting other WTO members).
39. See Bartels, supra note 15, at 522 (explaining that the GSP scheme is
“an autonomous regime granted on a non-reciprocal, generalized and nondiscriminatory basis” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Moss, supra
note 9, at 670 (explaining the principle of graduation where “developing countries accept greater obligations under the GATT as their economic situations
improve and are graduated from a country’s GSP regime once they reach a
specified level of economic development”).
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Countries’ understanding of the Enabling Clause’s provisions, however, remains incomplete. The meaning of “generalized,” for instance, swings between two extremes: a broad scope
of product coverage or a narrow application to countries.40 In
contrast, the WTO has interpreted “non-reciprocal” more concretely, providing that developed countries should not expect
mutual benefits for their trade preferences.41 Moreover, the
WTO has understood “non-discriminatory” to mean that developed countries should not discriminate between the developing
countries when granting preferences.42 In 2002, India challenged the European Communities’ (EC) preferential programs
by claiming that the EC violated the nondiscriminatory requirement and the MFN rule.43 The WTO Appellate Body, however, found that the least-developed countries (LDCs) could be
differentiated based on “development, financial or trade
need[s].”44 These “needs” must meet three criteria: they must
be objective, they must be effectively addressed through trade
preferences, and the treatment must be sufficiently connected
to the need.45 As a result of the Enabling Clause, developed
countries have another route through which they may provide
duty-free treatment on products to help developing countries
enter their markets.46
Thus, due to the WTO consensus in response to developing
countries and the MFN rule, WTO member countries no longer
violate the MFN rule if they provide trade preferences to developing countries, provided they acquire the WTO waiver or adhere to the Enabling Clause.47

40. See Shaffer & Apea, supra note 10, at 994.
41. See Bartels, supra note 15, at 528.
42. Id. at 524.
43. See Lorand Bartels, The WTO Legality of the EU’s GSP+ Arrangement,
10 J. INT’L ECON. L. 869, 873 (2007); Moss, supra note 9, at 665.
44. Bartels, supra note 43, at 873 (footnote omitted); see also Moss, supra
note 9, at 666 (stating that the WTO held that “the Enabling Clause requires
that identical tariff preferences under GSP schemes be provided to all developing countries without differentiation except in the cases of least-developed
countries (LDCs)” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
45. See Bartels, supra note 43, at 873. For countries not considered to be
LDCs, the WTO Appellate Body decision in response to India’s 2002 challenge
only resulted in minor modifications for trade programs. See Moss, supra note
9, at 667.
46. See Enabling Clause, supra note 37, at 203.
47. See id.; Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 29, art. IX.
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B. ENACTMENT AND STATUS OF TRADE PREFERENCE PROGRAMS
After the principle of granting trade preferences no longer
conflicted with existing trade law, many developed countries
formed programs to help industrialize developing countries.48
The United States, for example, created the GSP program that
provides duty-free treatment for about 4800 products from 131
countries.49 The program allows qualified countries to send
their GSP-eligible products to the developed country without
paying the customary duty.50
All countries model their trade preference programs on either positive or negative conditionality, though negative modeling is more predominant than positive.51 The United States, for
instance, engages in negative conditionality, which takes preferences away if a developing country engages in undesirable
behavior, such as human rights violations.52 Many European
nations engage in positive conditionality, such as the GSP Plus
program, where certain products get an additional reduction in
duty rates if an LDC complies with certain standards.53 The
GSP Plus program requires that the country ratify and implement sixteen human rights conventions and at least seven of
eleven good governance conventions.54 The country also must
be a vulnerable country based on poverty, nondiversification of
exports, and its share of EU GSP-covered imports.55
48. See, e.g., Authority to Extend Preferences, 19 U.S.C. § 2461 (2006); see
also Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, id. §§ 2701–2707; Andean Trade
Preferences Act, id. §§ 3201–3206; African Growth and Opportunity Act, id.
§§ 3701–3741; Generalised System of Preferences (GSP), EUR. COMMISSION, http://
ec.europa.eu/trade/wider-agenda/development/generalised-system-of-preferences/
(last visited Mar. 4, 2011).
49. See Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), OFF. U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-topics/trade-development/preference
-programs/generalized-system-preference-gsp (last visited Mar. 4, 2011).
50. See U.S. Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) Guidebook, OFF. U.S.
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (Jan. 2010), http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/1578.
51. See Bartels, supra note 15, at 508 n.5.
52. See id. at 508; Telephone Interview with Marideth Sandler, supra note 5.
53. See Council Regulation (EC) 732/2008, arts. 8–9, 2008 O.J. (L 211/1),
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:
211:0001:0039:EN:PDF (providing a list of criteria); Bartels, supra note 15, at
510 (noting that only Moldova received special preferences through labor rights).
54. See Bartels, supra note 43, at 871 (stating that the country must be
vulnerable, and ratify and implement conventions on human and labor rights,
environmental protection, and governance).
55. See id. at 871; see also id. at 880 (“One situation in which preferential
treatment would clearly not be permitted is when a beneficiary country does
not, in fact, have the need at issue.”); EUR. COMMISSION, supra note 48.
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Productivity assessments of trade preference programs are
conflicting. On the one hand, global GSP programs noticeably
increased the number of exports from developing countries between 1976 and 1980, as GSP-related imports reportedly grew
by twenty-seven percent each year.56 Further, after GSP was
instituted, developing countries increased their share in the
world merchandise trade from twenty percent in 1973 to twenty-eight percent in 1998.57 On the other hand, in 1982, exports
through GSP were only one percent of total developing country
exports.58 Many argue, therefore, that trade preferences have
done little to accomplish the stated goal in an efficient manner.59 The United States, however, considers its trade preference program based on the African Growth and Opportunity
Act (AGOA) to be its most successful trade preference program
because it has aided economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa.60
Thus, while many programs have lackluster results, AGOA, at
the least, is considered a success.
Commentators offer no shortage of explanations as to why
trade preference programs only marginally help developing
countries grow. One reason is that reductions in MFN tariff
rates reduce the small margin of comparative advantage that
GSP duty-free treatment is meant to provide.61 Also, short-term
56. See SEC’Y-GEN., supra note 3, at 12.
57. See Moss, supra note 9, at 671.
58. See SEC’Y-GEN., supra note 3, at 92 tbl.IV.
59. See Moon, supra note 24, at 619 (opining on the “relative failure of
[special and differential treatment]”); Moss, supra note 9, at 670 (“[T]hey have
done little to accelerate the economic growth rates of most developing countries.”). But see Ochieng, supra note 11, at 378–79 (arguing that it “would be
erroneous to claim that all preferential schemes have failed” based on the
graduation of South Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, and Hong Kong from United
States and European Union GSP programs and that “[e]ven among the ACP
group, countries such as Mauritius and Botswana made significant gains”).
60. See Preference Programs, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://
www.ustr.gov/trade-topics/trade-development/preference-programs (last visited
Mar. 4, 2011) (“Another highly successful program is the African Growth and
Opportunity Act (AGOA), which was enacted in 2000 and also allows duty-free
entry of goods from 40 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.”); see also Moss, supra
note 9, at 668 (“AGOA is a unique and meaningful vehicle for economic growth
in [sub-Saharan Africa].”). AGOA beneficiaries must meet specific requirements such as complying with intellectual property rights and engaging in liberal economies. See Lenaghan, supra note 30, at 123.
61. See GALLAGHER, supra note 31, at 15; George A. Bermann & Petros C.
Mavroidis, Developing Countries in the WTO System, in WTO LAW AND
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 1, 1 (George A. Bermann & Petros C. Mavroidis eds.,
2007) (suggesting that preference erosions weakened the effectiveness of trade
preference programs); see also Harry G. Johnson, Trade Preferences for Manu-
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annual renewals and waivers62 and the disputed legality of
trade preferences creates unreliability since developing countries cannot indefinitely count on utilizing the benefits of trade
preference programs.63 Another criticism is that developed
countries limit or revoke their preferences based on political
pressures.64 In response to this problem, some developing countries advocate that the Enabling Clause should be mandatory
to prevent political abuse.65 A further alleged problem is that
the mismatched product coverage limits the potential for effective benefits.66 While some claim that the AGOA program is
more successful because it offers more product coverage (in certain apparel articles) than the regular GSP,67 approximately
twenty-seven percent of developing countries’ GDP and fifty
percent of their employment derives from agricultural products,68 which the programs typically exclude.69 Additionally,
high production costs, poor and unreliable infrastructure, and
less effective marketing hinders manufacturers in developing
factured Goods, in ECONOMIC POLICIES TOWARD LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
(1967), reprinted in TRADE PREFERENCES AND DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT OF
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 33, 69 (Bernard Hoekman & Çağlar Özden eds., 2006).
62. See Pablo M. Bentes et al., International Trade, 44 INT’L LAW. 93, 110
(2010) (stating that ATPA and U.S. GSP were extended through December 31,
2010, “just as they were about to expire” (citing Act to Extend the Generalized
System of Preferences and the Andean Trade Preference Act, Pub. L. No. 111124, § 2, 123 Stat. 3484, 3484 (2009))); Marinberg, supra note 32, at 134 (arguing that the indefinite nature of waivers “indirectly limits each waiver[’s]”
effectiveness); Moss, supra note 9, at 672.
63. See Olufemi Amao, Trade Sanctions, Human Rights and Multinational Corporations: The EU-ACP Context, 32 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV.
379, 396–97 (2009) (citing the possibility of revocation of trade benefits for
human rights violations).
64. See SEC’Y-GEN., supra note 3, at 11 (stating that there are political
pressures against giving benefits); Moon, supra note 24, at 633 (“The USA, for
example, has used its GSP scheme as ‘a tool to penalize and pressure . . . those
developing countries whose domestic, trade or international policies conflict
with the policies or interests of the USA.’” (footnote omitted)).
65. See Moon, supra note 24, at 635 (“[T]oo few of the provisions impose
binding obligations on the industrialized countries, with the result that the
assistance described generally does not eventuate.”).
66. See Robert Z. Lawrence, Futures for the World Trading System and
Their Implications for Developing Countries, in TRADE AND GROWTH 43, 57
(Manuel R. Agosin & Diana Tussie eds., 1993) (noting that the Lomé Convention and Caribbean Basin Initiative limited product scope); Moss, supra note
9, at 671–72 (arguing that preference programs fail to give meaningful benefits in important production areas).
67. See Moss, supra note 9, at 676–77.
68. See id. at 673.
69. See Ochieng, supra note 11, at 381.
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countries.70 Lastly, eligibility requirements to qualify for special preferences, such as complying with rules of origin and
phytosanitary standards,71 may pose unsurpassable barriers.72
In short, there are numerous identified problems with trade
preference programs.
Though trade preference programs occasionally produce
results, the overall consensus is that they do not accomplish
enough.73 Amidst the many problems that plague these programs, the key issues seem to be mismatched product coverage,
the unreliability of the programs’ existence, and the developed
countries’ unawareness of the barriers facing developing countries that want to use the trade preference programs.74
II. A CLOSER LOOK: SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS WITH
CURRENT TRADE PREFERENCE PROGRAMS
The ineffectiveness of trade preference programs signifies
the existence of a problem with the current approach to providing trade preferences. While the programs rest on solid conceptual foundations, many issues impede their successful implementation. A closer analysis of the programs reveals potential
areas for improvement. If countries acknowledge and remedy
these problems, the programs would likely maximize aid for
developing countries, increase international trade, and, in effect, foster global economic growth.

70. See MURRAY, supra note 13, at 147; Ochieng, supra note 11, at 381
(finding that product coverage “typically excludes ‘import-sensitive’ and ‘competitive-need’ products from beneficiary countries”).
71. See Anastasios Tomazos, The GSP Fallacy: A Critique of the Appellate
Body’s Ruling in the GSP Case on Legal, Economic, and Political/Systemic
Grounds, in WTO LAW AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 61, at 306,
318; see also Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Apr. 15, 1994), http://www.wto.org/english/
docs_e/legal_e/15-sps.pdf (WTO agreement stating that Sanitary and Phytosanitary are standards related to human, animal, plant life, or health).
72. See Ochieng, supra note 11, at 381 (finding that eligibility criteria can
be costly and possibly infringe on the nonreciprocity element of the Enabling
Clause).
73. See Mohammedi, supra note 30, at 396 (stating that Algeria and many
other countries in the Middle East and North Africa fail to take advantage of
the program despite the fact that they import GSP-eligible products to countries other than the United States); Moss, supra note 9, at 671.
74. See MURRAY, supra note 13, at 147; Moss, supra note 9, at 676–77
(listing barriers).
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A. THE ELIGIBLE PRODUCTS LIST IS INSUFFICIENT
A significant problem with trade preference programs is
that the scope of product coverage conflicts with market-based
considerations.75
Participating developed countries provide duty-free treatment to only a limited amount of specific products, irrespective
of the market.76 Those products are rarely the most beneficial
or useful for the program participants.77 As a result, trade preference programs become empty gestures of assistance with developed countries expending little actual effort.
Developed countries often restrict their product coverage in
order to protect domestic industries.78 The concern is that if a
country is granted duty-free treatment for a product that domestic suppliers produce, the foreign supplier will gain a competitive advantage over the domestic supplier, which could shut
out domestic suppliers from the market and cause domestic job
loss.79 Two contrasting points arise from this concern. First,
trade preference programs inherently protect against the concern that developing countries may unnecessarily take advantage of the trade preferences.80 Once a country exports a quota
amount of product, the country no longer receives duty-free
treatment for the remainder of that year.81 For example, the
U.S. GSP program revokes duty-free treatment if the imports
account for fifty percent or more of the value of total U.S. imports of that product, or exceed a certain dollar value, which in
2011 is $145 million.82 The purpose of trade preference programs is to aid struggling developing countries just enough so
75. See Moss, supra note 9, at 676–77 (outlining steps necessary to qualify
for preferential treatment).
76. E.g., GSP-Eligible Products, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://
www.ustr.gov/trade-topics/trade-development/preference-programs/generalized
-system-preference-gsp/gsp-program-i-0 (last visited Mar. 4, 2011).
77. See Moss, supra note 9, at 671–72.
78. See Ochieng, supra note 11, at 381 (finding that product coverage excludes sensitive industries).
79. See Generalized System of Preferences Renewal Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-573, § 501(b)(10)(A), 98 Stat. 3018, 3018 (stating that the purpose of
the Act is to promote trade in a manner that “does not adversely affect United
States producers and workers”).
80. See Leal-Arcas, supra note 1, at 359 (stating that there is “graduation
for product groups where competitiveness has increased”); Moss, supra note 9,
at 670.
81. See supra note 80.
82. See U.S. Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) Guidebook, supra
note 50, at 11.
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that they can enter foreign markets and grow their economies.83 Thus, the concern that the domestic supplier will be unfairly disadvantaged is unfounded: the developing country
stops receiving benefits when they become truly competitive
with domestic suppliers.84 Further, the benefits of efficient international trade outweigh the short-term need to protect domestic suppliers.85 A larger and more efficient global economy
helps all countries trade more and improves their relations.86
Second, free market and free trade principles propose that
a country should manufacture products for which it has a comparative advantage.87 If the domestic supplier cannot compete
with a foreign producer, then its failure likely suggests it
should enter a different industry. The domestic supplier should
focus on skills or resources in which foreign countries are less
strong, in order to gain the comparative advantage.88 The concepts of “supply and demand” and comparative advantage suggest that consumers will seek the best deal, and that countries
should not prevent parties from selling goods at more competitive prices.89 Tariffs on developing countries’ products cut into
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

See SEC’Y-GEN., supra note 3, at 9.
See id. at 20, 23.
See MURRAY, supra note 13, at 21.
See Leal-Arcas, supra note 1, at 346.
See DAVID RICARDO, ON THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND
TAXATION (1821), reprinted in 1 THE WORKS AND CORRESPONDENCE OF DAVID
RICARDO 373–78 (Piero Sraffa ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1951); see also Paul
Krugman, Ricardo’s Difficult Idea (Mar. 1996) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://web.mit.edu/krugman/www/ricardo.htm (“‘According to Ricardo, each nation should specialize in those activities in which it excels, so
that it can have the greatest advantage relative to other countries. Thus, a nation should narrow its focus of activity, abandoning certain industries and developing those in which it has the largest comparative advantage. As a result,
international trade would grow as nations export their surpluses and import
the products that they no longer manufacture, efficiency and productivity
would increase in line with economies of scale and prosperity would be enhanced.’” (quoting JAMES GOLDSMITH, THE TRAP 1 (1994))); Bureau of Labor
Statistics, Glossary, U.S. DEPARTMENT LABOR, http://www.bls.gov/bls/glossary
.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2011) (defining comparative advantage as: “When
one nation’s opportunity cost of producing an item is less than another nation’s opportunity cost of producing that item. A good or service with which a
nation has the largest absolute advantage (or smallest absolute disadvantage)
is the item for which they have a comparative advantage.”).
88. See Krugman, supra note 87 (discussing the economic gains that result when workers move into industries in which the nation has a comparative
advantage).
89. Wentong Zheng, The Pitfalls of the (Perfect) Market Benchmark: The
Case of Countervailing Duty Law, 19 MINN. J. INT’L L. 1, 13 (2010) (stating
that “resources flow to their most profitable and efficient uses” (citing Carbon
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any advantage from low-input costs the producer may have and
thus make their potentially more efficient product less desirable.90 Therefore, developed countries should not try to prevent
competition.
The main problem regarding product scope is that the
omission of sensitive products excludes key industries that
could significantly benefit developing countries and fuel economic growth.91 Primarily, preference programs exclude textiles, apparel, and agriculture from duty-free treatment.92
These fields tend to be very important areas for the economic
development of many countries, especially low-income developing countries.93 Developing countries would have more opportunities to use trade preferences if they received duty-free
treatment for these types of products.94 However, sensitive domestic industries bar these items to protect themselves.95 For
example, the United States protects the textile and agricultural
industries to ensure their survival against potentially cheaper
foreign products.96 As a result, there is a gap between the developing countries’ exports of beneficiaries and the product coverage in trade preference programs.97 If developed countries
opened up product coverage to include more items in textiles,
Steel Wire Rod from Poland; Final Negative Countervailing Duty Determination, 49 Fed. Reg. 19,374, 19,375 (May 7, 1984))).
90. See Whitney J. Smith, Trade Adjustment Assistance: An Underdeveloped Alternative to Import Restrictions, 56 ALB. L. REV. 943, 943 n.3 (1993)
(describing the negative impact of tariffs on a domestic economy).
91. See Edwini Kessie, The Legal Status of Special and Differential
Treatment Provisions Under the WTO Agreements, in WTO LAW AND
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 61, at 12, 13–14.
92. See Moss, supra note 9, at 671–72; see also GALLAGHER, supra note 31,
at 31; Kessie, supra note 91, at 14 (highlighting a weakness due to “‘exclusion
of sensitive products which are of export interest to developing countries’”
(quoting Bonapas F. Onguglo, Developing Countries and Trade Preferences, in
TRADE RULES IN THE MAKING: CHALLENGES IN REGIONAL AND MULTILATERAL
NEGOTIATIONS 119 (Miguel R. Mendoza et al. eds., 1999))).
93. See Lawrence, supra note 66, at 57–58 (“[T]he full array of GATT rules
has not been extended to sectors such as agriculture which are vital to many
developing countries . . . .”).
94. See Kessie, supra note 91, at 14.
95. Shellyn G. McCaffrey, North American Free Trade and Labor Issues:
Accomplishments and Challenges, 10 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 449, 462 (1993) (stating that sensitive industries in the United States are “manufacturers of footwear, ceramic tile, and glassware and growers of fruits and vegetables” and
that a flood of imports would hurt those domestic producers). For an argument
against needing to protect domestic industries, see infra Part III.B.3.
96. McCaffrey, supra note 95, at 462.
97. See Kessie, supra note 91, at 14.
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apparel, and agriculture, trade preference programs may become more utilized and thus more effective.
In contrast, current product coverage focuses too much on
useless products.98 The developing country may not even produce the covered products, or such products may comprise only
a tiny part of their market where utilization of duty-free treatment will not help the developing country grow economically.99
Providing preferences for impractical products is an empty gesture that illuminates the lack of effectiveness of trade preference programs. The key is to expand product coverage to products that the developing countries show strength in producing.
Though that may make it more difficult for domestic suppliers,
in the long term an efficient international economy will produce
justifiable benefits.100 Hence, developing countries’ potential in
an industry coupled with their inability to infiltrate foreign
markets,101 which they would be able to do if not for the government-imposed trade barriers, implies that such countries
need help to gain access to foreign markets. The duty-free
treatment may provide enough assistance so they can enter
foreign markets and grow economically while helping the international economy reach maximum productivity.
The success of AGOA in relation to the other programs
demonstrates the importance of product coverage to the success
of trade preference programs.102 While most programs limit
coverage and consequently their success,103 AGOA has more
coverage and is reputed to be more successful than other trade
preference programs.104 Specifically, AGOA allows eligible ap-

98. See, e.g., id.
99. See Johnson, supra note 61, at 72 (arguing that it would be beneficial
to give “priority to products that the less developed countries have already
shown a capacity to export competitively (in contrast to the infant-industry
arguments for confining preferences to products they cannot export competitively at present)”).
100. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 87.
101. See, e.g., SEC’Y-GEN., supra note 3, at 9.
102. See Moss, supra note 9, at 668.
103. Cf. Lawrence, supra note 66, at 57 (discussing proposals to broaden
the scope of GATT).
104. See Moss, supra note 9, at 676, 680–81; see also African Growth and
Opportunity Act, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/trade
-topics/trade-development/preference-programs/african-growth-and-opportunity
-act-agoa (last visited Mar. 4, 2011).
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parel articles and most agricultural goods.105 AGOA country
participants likely utilize the program more than other developing countries because of the more expansive coverage.106 For
instance, from 1999 to 2003, apparel exports increased 176 percent while vehicles and parts exports increased by 424 percent.107 Thus, if other trade preference programs expand their
coverage, it seems likely that they will be more successful.
In short, product coverage is a significant problem for trade
preference programs. Developed countries do not provide dutyfree treatment for products that may actually assist developing
countries. Reviewing the eligible products list and including
more appropriate products would help promote economic
growth in developing countries.
B. THE SHORT-TERM NATURE OF THE PROGRAMS
Another weakness related to the implementation and
structure of current trade preference programs that likely impacts such programs’ potential is that they typically receive only short-term renewals.108 Because even a WTO waiver is not
indefinite,109 countries cannot establish permanent programs
that are effective. The reasoning behind annual renewals is
that trade preference programs facilitate economic growth until
countries can fairly compete under the MFN rule, so the programs do not need to exist beyond their utility and must be reviewed regularly.110 This short-term characteristic, however,
weakens the programs and possibly infringes on its effectiveness.
Developed countries may not allocate as much funding to
the programs as they would if the programs were more permanent.111 For example, the U.S. GSP program is extremely un-

105. See Moss, supra note 9, at 677–78; Fact Sheet on AGOA, OFF. U.S.
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (2009), http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/AGOA%
20Fact%20Sheet%2003.09.pdf.
106. See Fact Sheet on AGOA, supra note 105 (stating that non-oil AGOA
imports increased by fifty-one percent in 2008).
107. See Moss, supra note 9, at 680.
108. See id. at 671–72; see also, e.g., Kelly Chen et al., Customs Law, 43
INT’L LAW. 289, 303–04 (2009) (stating that Congress passed a one-year renewal of the GSP program in 2008).
109. See, e.g., Marinberg, supra note 32, at 134.
110. See Moss, supra note 9, at 670 (discussing graduation).
111. See Telephone Interview with Marideth Sandler, supra note 5 (noting
that the unknown future of the program makes it hard to request more funding).
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derstaffed and overworked.112 If a developed country believes
the program may not be renewed, it likely will not continue to
put effort and time into something that soon will not exist. Further, frequent renewals may prevent developing countries from
engaging in long-term planning because the program’s future
existence is uncertain.113 This uncertainty undermines the programs since countries may not believe they are a usable tool.114
Allocation of resources limits developing countries.115 Even if
they know about the potential benefits of a trade preference
program with a developed country, and even if their exports are
covered under the eligibility list, they may not want to expend
the time and energy to learn about and utilize trade preference
programs if they are unsure that they will be around for much
longer. It may not be profitable and worthwhile to begin the
process of preparing the product for export if there is a chance
that by the time they are able to begin profitably exporting, the
trade preference may no longer be usable.116 AGOA provides an
interesting contrast: Congress renewed the program through
September 2015 in the AGOA Acceleration Act of 2004.117
AGOA may be more successful because it is long term, and is
thus a reliable undertaking to provide trade preferences.118
Governments should similarly enact other GSP programs for a
longer period of time.
Another problematic aspect for trade programs is that they
are not concretely accepted under WTO law.119 A “cloud of uncertainty” regarding the legality surrounds the programs, such
as the EU’s GSP Plus arrangement.120 Accordingly, even if a
country enacts a program with a sufficient period of existence,
there are always the foundational questions about whether the
program is legal under WTO law and, if not, whether it will ex112. See id.
113. See Marinberg, supra note 32, at 134.
114. See Moss, supra note 9, at 671–72.
115. Cf. Alexandros Zervos, Linking Natural Resource Exploitation and
Primary Health Care in Developing Countries, 11 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN
AFF. 227, 228 (2006) (showing how developing countries have problems with
health care resulting from issues with resource allocation because of limited
funds and occasional corruption).
116. See Hunter R. Clark, African “Renaissance” and U.S. Trade Policy, 27
GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 265, 269 n.22 (1999) (contrasting export industries’
high start-up costs with the short-term nature of trade preference programs).
117. See Moss, supra note 9, at 678.
118. See, e.g., id.
119. See Amao, supra note 63, at 396.
120. Id.
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ist for much longer. It seems likely that this issue also weakens
the reliability and effectiveness of trade preference programs.
Even if short-term approval for the program does not deter developing countries from using trade preference programs, the
uncertainty may prevent the program employees from engaging
in long-term and possibly beneficial planning or ideas.121
If the enacted programs do not present a reliable option,
people in both developed and developing countries will not take
the preferences seriously. They may not utilize the preferences,
which may explain the current lack of observed achievement.
In order to provide lasting economic growth, trade programs
must last beyond a couple of years.
C. INITIAL AND OVERLOOKED HURDLES FOR EXPORTERS
Even if developed countries present a perfectly created
trade preference program that deals with optimal products and
contains a long mandate, exporters in developing countries face
significant domestic hurdles they must overcome before they
can profitably export. If they want to sincerely assist with economic growth, trade preference programs need to address the
foundational problems facing developing country exporters by
providing crucial and profit-maximizing information.
In order to participate in trade preference programs, developing countries must meet varied requirements that pose significant obstacles.122 For instance, if such country’s product is a
food item, it must meet stringent sanitary and phytosanitary
standards, which can take years to accomplish.123 Additionally,
complying with the standards can be costly, which further impinges on the program’s realistic and perceived utility.124 Even
though the standards are necessary for health concerns, trade
preference programs should take the related expenses into account and adjust benefits accordingly, or even provide relevant
information and tips to help exporters begin to efficiently plan
121. Cf. Moss, supra note 9, at 671–72.
122. See Kessie, supra note 91, at 14 (listing obstacles such as rules of origins, quotas, designation criteria, and noneconomic conditions); Tomazos, supra note 71, at 318 (suggesting other reasons for lack of success).
123. See J. Michael Finger & Philip Schuler, Implementation of Uruguay
Round Commitments: The Development Challenge, 23 WORLD ECON. 511, 517–
19 (2000) (discussing the multiyear process required to comply with international sanitation standards for exports).
124. See id. at 518–19, 525 (discussing Argentina’s $80 million program to
comply with export sanitation standards and the potential cost of similar
projects).
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their future.125 Thus, more information or increased GSP benefits would help override government-imposed costs, those that
would not be present in a free market, so that the global economy reaches maximum efficiency. Developing countries often
claim that preferences would be helpful if they were more attainable.126
Further, even if exporters meet the requirements, they
must deal with internal obstacles that add to the high cost of
exporting. For example, exporters in developing countries typically have less effective distribution channels.127 In order to efficiently export their products, they should have reliable infrastructure and find ways to distribute their goods in the most
profitable way.128 A related point is that they also face problems with effective marketing.129 Even if they successfully export their products, there may not be any consumer demand in
the developed country because of lack of marketing and effective distributors. This negates both their and the trade preference program’s goal. It may cost too much for the venture to be
profitable if the exporter hires an effective marketer or distributor.130 Developing countries also face a problem with infrequent domestic transportation.131 The effort to find reliable
ground transportation to lessen shipping expenses may not
even make the endeavor to utilize the program worthwhile.132
These factors all produce a very high production cost that cuts
into the profitability and, thus, the desire to utilize trade preference programs.
Given all of the initial costs to export and market, the
small margin of benefits from using the programs further hinders its profitability.133 If the regular tariff reductions that all
125. See id. at 524 (discussing the role the WTO can play in investmentdevelopment standards needed to comply with trade standards).
126. See Kessie, supra note 91, at 14.
127. Cf. Ari Bessendorf, Note, Games in the Hothouse: Theoretical Dimensions in Climate Change, 28 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 325, 328 (2005)
(stating that developing countries have underdeveloped infrastructure and
lack of resources).
128. See MURRAY, supra note 13, at 147.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See UNCTAD, Industrial Exports from the Developing Countries and
Preferences, in TOWARDS A NEW TRADE POLICY FOR DEVELOPMENT: REPORT BY
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE
AND DEVELOPMENT (1964), reprinted in TRADE PREFERENCES AND
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countries receive come close to the duty-free treatment of trade
preference products,134 potential exporters may not even attempt to take advantage of the program. For example, the duty
rate for dried apricots is merely 1.8 cents per kilogram.135 As a
result, the benefit of using GSP may not be worth the effort if
the exporter saves very little in the transaction. In that situation, the potential exporters will not expand their market and
their country will not have the desired economic growth.
Trade preference programs also need to take into account
the initial hurdles exporters must face. For example, the programs can provide information on the most cost-effective means
of transportation and other pertinent information. If the country in question does not change the legislation behind trade
preference programs, exporters may rarely use trade preferences in the way intended, and economic development will take
longer. In sum, developed countries are not fulfilling their obligations to help developing countries since they basically provide ineffective and impractical benefits through the current
trade preference programs. Product coverage is not specific
enough to provide meaningful aid to the developing countries.
Further, the programs’ unreliability weakens their usefulness
and makes them an impractical resource. Lastly, the exporters
themselves face significant hurdles that trade preference programs overlook.
III. ACTIVE REPRESENTATION OF EXPORTERS FROM
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
While there may be other solutions to help developing
countries secure economic growth, this Note focuses solely on
how to improve the existing trade preference programs. In order to improve the effectiveness of GSP, lawmakers, through
legislation, need to change the structure and role of trade preference programs to act as exporters’ agents. Though it would be
best if the changes were widespread throughout international
DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 61, at 3,
13 (“A small margin of preference is not likely to provide adequate incentives
for establishing new export industries in developing countries. If a new system
of preferences is worth introducing at all, the margins of preference should
provide incentives that are clearly adequate in relation to the magnitude of
the problem.”).
134. Id.
135. U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, HARMONIZED TARIFF SCHEDULE OF THE
UNITED STATES ch. 8 (2010), available at http://www.usitc.gov/publications/
docs/tata/hts/bychapter/1000C08.pdf.
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policy, the United States at the very least should enforce them.
The program’s change in role would more effectively assist exporters and, consequently, benefit international trade. Further,
a developed country would reap benefits beyond the altruistic
desire to aid developing countries and alleviate global poverty.
The greater spread of industrialization means that world trade
would be closer to reaching an efficient market with the lowest
consumer prices.136 Lower prices may induce countries to not
engage in protectionism.137 Also, there would be more opportunities for developed countries to create and support more
specialized jobs.138 Lastly, though there may be the concern
about the unfairness of one’s country helping foreign, but not
domestic, producers, the program is only for qualified developing countries that need the benefits to overcome trade barriers
(which domestic suppliers do not face) to maximize efficiency.
A. BENEFITS OF IMPLEMENTING THE PROPOSED SOLUTION
If trade preference programs shift their role so their employees more actively represent and assist developing country
exporters within the developed country, numerous benefits
would arise. First, if the role of trade preference programs is to
represent exporters, like an agent, the program should provide
more individual attention regarding product coverage. Currently, trade preference programs, such as the U.S. GSP, already
give some specialized attention to countries regarding products
and new profitable areas for exporters.139 In meetings and
presentations, the program employees highlight products that
countries specialize in that can be exported under duty-free
treatment.140 Thus, they inform the developing countries of opportunities to take complete advantage of every product under

136. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 87.
137. Alan O. Sykes, Regulatory Protectionism and the Law of International
Trade, 66 U CHI. L. REV. 1, 5 (1999) (“Protectionism draws high cost domestic
firms into the market while excluding low cost foreign firms, and it prices out
of the market some consumers who would be willing to purchase goods at a
price exceeding the marginal cost of production of efficient suppliers.”).
138. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 87.
139. See Telephone Interview with Marideth Sandler, supra note 5; GSP in
Use—Country Specific Information, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://
www.ustr.gov/trade-topics/trade-development/preference-programs/generalized
-system-preferences-gsp/gsp-use-%E2%80%93-coun (last visited Mar. 4, 2011)
(listing links to country-specific PowerPoint presentations showing the program’s country-specific efforts).
140. Telephone Interview with Marideth Sandler, supra note 5.
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the current products list.141 However, the U.S. GSP is understaffed so it can only sincerely focus on a few countries at a
time.142 Hence, legislation needs to set aside more funding and
resources to increase the staff so that there will be more directed attention to the participating developing countries.143
Another benefit from directed attention is that the employees
may discover, through detailed economic analysis and discussion with exporters, new and useful areas that are not included
in the product coverage.144 Then, programs can attempt, as advocates for the developing country, to get the new product or
industry onto the GSP-eligible products list. If the programs
have more resources and employees, they would deal with more
countries, exporters, and their products to get more results for
developing countries.
Second, an increase in resources to allow the program to effectively represent developing countries would signal the developed countries’ determined and sincere effort to help developing
countries industrialize and grow. It would make the program
reliable and would help make international trade efficient. Increased funding may also present the idea that the developed
country supports the program and would attempt to keep the
program running. Therefore, it would be a stable and responsible route for exporters to take since the increased funding lessens the gamble of depending on the continuation of trade preference benefits.
Third, the program’s employees should encourage “exportmindedness,”145 which means that the developing-country producers would want to send their products to other countries despite the difficulties and high costs.146 The program representative would provide exporters, and even locals for posterity, with
relevant information to make the exporting process easier.147
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. See infra Part III.B.3 for a discussion of why Congress should increase
funding for GSP.
144. See GSP in Use—Country Specific Information, supra note 139 (showing the country-specific efforts that point out possible products).
145. See UNCTAD, supra note 133, at 3, 20 (“[I]t is necessary to induce export-mindedness.”).
146. See id.; Christian Wilhelms, Export Drive by a Developing Country, 2
INTERECONOMICS 209, 211 (1967) (discussing Brazil’s (then) new exportoriented trade policy).
147. Exporters may not be aware they are missing out on other export opportunities. CHRISTOPHER STEVENS & JANE KENNAN, MAKING TRADE
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The programs’ employees should first find “clients” in developing countries. Though the U.S. GSP already meets with ambassadors and diplomats, travels to foreign countries to give informational presentations, and attends trade fairs, the lack of
resources limits their ability to consistently and ardently engage in thorough maximizing efforts.148 More resources would
lead to more exposure, allowing GSP to provide exporters with
useful information to make sure they claim every possible benefit. The information should range from product coverage, to
how best to deal with eligibility and rule of origin requirements, to the best methods of transportation. This would facilitate the process of encouraging producers to export their products.149 Further, the programs should advocate that it is worth
using them, even if there is just a small margin of benefits.
They should assuage any fears and concerns that the exporters
may have and provide them with the information that would
maximize their exports.
Lastly, the programs need to represent the developing
countries by acting as their marketers. Even if a producer exports its product to a developed country, if there is no demand,
then there will be no profit and the producer will no longer export the product and use the trade preference benefit.150 Preference program employees should work within their developed
country to market the product and find profitable distribution
centers. If they succeed, they would help the exporter maximize
their profitability. Further, the assistance would merely act as
a way to lessen trade barriers to maximize market efficiency,
rather than unfairly provide an advantage.151
The United States currently has regional programs that
show it recognizes the benefit in giving more specific attention
to developing countries.152 However, those programs are not accomplishing enough.153 The proposed changes differ from the
PREFERENCES MORE EFFECTIVE 6 (2004) (“Everyone knows about AGOA but
hardly anyone who is not already exporting to Europe knows about Cotonou.”).
148. Telephone Interview with Marideth Sandler, supra note 5 (discussing
the staffing and budget problems encountered by GSP).
149. See id. (discussing what GSP would do to promote trade).
150. See RICARDO, supra note 87, at 374 –75.
151. See, e.g., Steven L. Snell, The Development of Competition Policy in the
People’s Republic of China, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 575, 584 n.30 (1996)
(explaining that barriers to entry can artificially inflate prices compared to a
competitive market).
152. See, e.g., Andean Trade Preferences Act, 19 U.S.C. § 3201 (2006);
Trade Policy for Sub-Saharan Africa, id. § 3701.
153. See Moss, supra note 9, at 671.
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regional trade preference programs because the shift in roles is
more proactive and responsive to initial hurdles. A representative role ensures focused attention for developing countries so
that they maximize their benefits from trade preference programs.154 A shift in roles would make trade preference programs useful and help the developing countries grow economically and industrialize, whether by providing information on
the existence of trade preference programs, encouraging “export-mindedness,” or by helping to market the product.155 The
proposed changes, however, likely face a few significant hurdles.
B. POSSIBLE ISSUES WITH EXPANDING THE ROLE OF TRADE
PREFERENCE PROGRAMS
There are a few important issues with the recommended
changes. Such issues challenge the possibility and legality of
making trade preference programs act as the exporters’ representatives. The first concern is that the additional resources
required by an expanded GSP program expand the degree of
departure from the MFN rule. Second, increased involvement
by the programs may interfere with the free market. Third, the
public may perceive developed country governments as putting
the interests of foreigners before their own citizens. Nonetheless, each concern lacks sufficient weight to prevent the implementation of this Note’s solution.
1. The Proposed Solution Approaches Violation of the MFN
Rule
A realistic concern is that the proposed changes to trade
preference programs create too much differential treatment between countries.156 Developed countries provide a sizable advantage to developing countries if the wealthy countries devote
more resources to programs to help a select few enter domestic
developed country markets to profitably sell the developing

154. See Telephone Interview with Marideth Sandler, supra note 5 (discussing difficulties in making opportunities known to LDCs).
155. See id.
156. If S&DT goes too far beyond the Enabling Clause, it would violate the
MFN rule of equal treatment. Compare Enabling Clause, supra note 37, at 203
(authorizing differential treatment), with GATT, supra note 22, art. I (stipulating the MFN rule).
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country’s merchandise.157 The advantage very well might cross
the line between what the Enabling Clause allows and the
MFN rule requires.158 Thus, some may argue that the proposed
changes violate WTO principles and are illegal.
These concerns, however, are not different from those
present even before the inception of S&DT.159 The S&DT principle acknowledges that WTO members are not yet all at the
same level of development to fairly be subjected to the MFN
rule.160 Developed countries should engage in behavior, such as
trade preferences, that aids developing countries to grow economically so that the MFN rule can fairly be applicable to all
countries.161 Further, international trade will be more efficient
and all countries will benefit.162 Expanding the role of trade
programs to become representatives of developing countries
should not be considered a significant change in policy that justifies declaring a violation of the MFN rule. Further, the Enabling Clause only requires that preferences are generalized, nonreciprocal, and nondiscriminatory, characteristics that still
exist with the proposed changes.163 Thus, the alterations would
not be illegal under the MFN rule.
2. Increased Government Involvement May Interfere with the
Free Market
The demand for increased governmental involvement in
the free market is another concern. A principle of the free market system is that the government should not excessively regulate so that the market can reach a natural balance.164 If the
157. But see sources cited supra note 30. These authors emphasize the need
for differential treatment until countries are at a more equal stage of development.
158. See Enabling Clause, supra note 37, at 203–04.
159. See Moon, supra note 24, at 620 (discussing the motivations behind
the MFN rule).
160. See GALLAGHER, supra note 31, at 22 (discussing some WTO agreements that favor LDCs); sources cited supra note 30.
161. See Ochieng, supra note 11, at 374 –75.
162. See generally Krugman, supra note 87 (explaining how even trade between countries with disparate levels of value is efficient and can benefit both
countries).
163. See Bartels, supra note 15, at 522; see also Moss, supra note 9, at 670
(explaining the principle of graduation).
164. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 87 (discussing comparative advantage); cf. Hearing Designation Order, Application of EchoStar Communications Corporation, General Motors Corporation, and Hughes Electronics Corporation, Transferors & EchoStar Communications Corporation, Transferee,
17 FCC Rcd. 20,559, 20,629 n.184 (2002) (rejecting the applicants’ national
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government enacts a program that aggressively brings new actors into the market that may not otherwise enter, the government skews the free market and competition.165 Only the best
products at the cheapest prices should thrive in the marketplace, so a program that advocates the purchase of a certain
item may squeeze out of the market more efficiently produced
products.166 If the market seeks to maximize everyone’s comparative advantage, the program possibly provides a false advantage that may hurt the consumer market if prices drastically increase once the developing country graduates from dutyfree treatment.167
Nonetheless, the increased role of government would only
benefit products that have a viable future, based on economic
analysis, and that would otherwise be successful products in
the market if not for initial barriers such as the tariff rates and
lack of resources to find potential buyers.168 Trade preferences
are meant only to assist countries, not force wealth onto
them.169 Further, the proposed changes are meant to provide a
comparative advantage only for the countries that most need it
in order to industrialize. The changes only provide an initial
advantage which should not significantly affect free market
principles.170 More importantly, the changes lessen government-imposed barriers that hinder the free market. Therefore,
the concern of excessive interference is unfounded.

pricing plan, which would replace competition with regulatory oversight, conflicting “with the goal of allowing competition to replace regulation, that both
Congress and this Commission have long sought to achieve”); Leigh M. Murray,
Comment, Sirius Mistake: The FCC’s Failure to Stop a Merger to Monopoly in
Satellite Radio, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 83, 109 (2009) (highlighting the FCC’s “stated
preference for free market competition” (citing 17 FCC Rcd. at 20,629)).
165. Cf. 17 FCC Rcd. at 20,629 (explaining how price controls might counterintuitively lead to collusion and higher prices).
166. See Krugman, supra note 87 (discussing, in part, how market distortions can undermine efficiencies from specialization).
167. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 87 (defining comparative
advantage).
168. See Clark, supra note 116, at 269 n.22.
169. See Ochieng, supra note 11, at 374 –75 (noting that LDCs can modify
certain GATT provisions if they feel it is in their interests).
170. The domestic railroad system in the United States grew to maturity
under industrial policies that favored railroad growth—akin to an initial comparative advantage for an infant industry. Lane Kirkland, Industrial Policy:
An Answer to Economic Chaos, 5 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 23, 73–74 (1993).
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3. The Conflicting Duty Toward Domestic Constituency and
Global Trade
Lastly, this strategy requires the program to prioritize the
exporter’s interest over a domestic producer’s success. Domestic
producers and taxpayers may disagree with the use of their tax
payments to help foreigners compete and sell products.171 The
developed country’s government may face loyalty questions on
whether it should change the program to benefit global trade or
follow the short-term desires of its domestic constituency.
Taxpayers may even feel that the government uses the
country’s wealth to unfairly aid strong nations, such as China,172 in selling its products. Trade preference programs, however, only help developing countries that qualify based on economic development, which should diminish this concern since
well-off countries like China do not qualify.173 Further, the programs have a safety trigger whereby countries that successfully
export a product past a certain quota no longer qualify for dutyfree treatment.174 Consequently, taxpayers’ concern that proposed changes would assist developing countries dominate domestic markets is unfounded, since the programs only help
countries that have difficulty exporting their goods and are unable to enter the international market.
Additionally, the concern mirrors the idea of the MFN rule:
one should not provide special treatment.175 However, the WTO
recognized that S&DT is understandable in certain situations,
one of which is providing trade preferences.176 This Note’s proposed expansion does not mean that developed countries will
not protect their own producers. The program would only act as
a local representative, and domestic producers would compete
171. Domestic producers may disagree when it hurts their own industries.
However, protectionism is inefficient for international trade and should be
avoided. See Robert W. McGee, An Economic Analysis of Protectionism in the
United States with Implications for International Trade in Europe, 26 GEO.
WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 539, 539 (1993).
172. See Mark S. Blodgett, Foreign Direct Investment, Trade, and China’s
Competition Laws, 37 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 201, 201 (2009) (commenting
on the strength of China); Markets for Referrals, 28 LEGAL MGMT., no. 3, April
2009 at 1, 8 (noting China’s strong presence in the global economy).
173. See Information on Countries Eligible for GSP, supra note 3.
174. See Moss, supra note 9, at 670 (explaining that developing countries
no longer qualify for GSP once they graduate).
175. See GATT, supra note 22, art. I, para. 1.
176. See Enabling Clause, supra note 37, at 203 (“Notwithstanding the
provision of Article I of the General Agreement, contracting parties may accord differential and more favourable treatment to developing countries . . . .”).
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with foreigners as they compete with the domestic competition.
Furthermore, the long-term benefits for all parties involved—
such as more jobs, higher GDPs, and increased global trade—
maximize as developing countries industrialize.177 Moreover,
duty-free treatment benefits only a few countries.178 Taxpayers
should not be concerned that their government’s actions work
against what is best for them. The preference program merely
serves as a way to make it easier to help developing countries
export more so they can grow economically, which eventually
benefits everyone.179
C. THE LEGALITY OF THE PROPOSED SOLUTION
The proposed expansion of the program’s role that calls for
more active representation may face opposition for stepping
beyond the boundaries that the WTO permits under the Enabling Clause and MFN rule.180 Nonetheless, the need to assist
developing countries with industrialization outweighs the potential problems. Also, the proposed changes are very similar to
the GSP Plus programs and the current failure of those programs may even qualify as an “exceptional circumstance.”
1. The View that Trade Preference Programs Should Be
Mandatory Suggests Support for an Increased Role
The current ineffectiveness of trade preference programs
implies that developed countries are not taking their goals seriously.181 If they were, they would likely have attempted to
change their programs to find a more productive strategy. A
minority view is that all developed countries should grant trade
preferences.182 A possible reason for trade preference programs’
modest results is that few provide duty-free treatment; trade
preferences would work better for economic growth if every able
177. Cf. Krugman, supra note 87 (describing Ricardo’s thesis that industrialization and specialization in developing nations increases global GDP).
178. E.g., Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), supra note 49 (showing
that only 131 countries benefit from the U.S. GSP program).
179. See generally Krugman, supra note 87 (explaining the concepts of
comparative advantage and absolute growth).
180. See Moss, supra note 9, at 670 (briefly describing the scope of the
S&DT and MFN doctrines).
181. See Generalized System of Preferences Renewal Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-573, § 501(b)(10)(A), 98 Stat. 3018, 3018 (lacking clear language that
would give the statute real power to affect change); SEC’Y-GEN., supra note 3,
at 12–13.
182. See Bartels, supra note 15, at 513.
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country provided them.183 More developing countries would export to more countries which should lead to quicker results.184
Even if every country does not provide them, the countries that
currently offer benefits should change their structure to make
their programs more efficient.
A mandatory program is based on the belief that economic
growth for developing countries is a vital interest.185 However,
WTO members created the Enabling Clause to allow countries
to engage in differential treatment, despite the MFN rule.186
They likely made the Enabling Clause optional to allow for political considerations when granting trade preferences.187 To
make trade programs mandatory would require an amendment
to the WTO Agreement.188
If the WTO refuses to make trade preference programs
mandatory, the next best step, if the WTO is serious about
helping developing countries, is to expand the program’s role to
make the voluntary programs capable of accomplishing something more through increased authority and direction. Those
who support a mandatory program likely support an expansion
of the program, such as this Note’s proposed changes, since
both recognize the importance of aiding developing countries
and seek to make that happen.189 Thus, the solution achieves
legitimacy in that it presents an option that is in the middle of
two extremes—demanding mandatory trade preferences or settling for the current ineffective programs.

183. See Moon, supra note 24, at 635 (“[T]oo few of the provisions impose
binding obligations on the industrialized countries, with the result that the
assistance described generally does not eventuate.”).
184. The purpose of GSP is to help developing countries overcome barriers
that keep developing countries out of developed markets. See EUR.
COMMISSION, supra note 48.
185. Moon, supra note 24, at 619; see also Bartels, supra note 15, at 511.
186. See supra Part I.A.
187. See Shun-yong Yeh, Dragging Out of or Deeper into Another Impasse
of the Political Economy of the World Trade Organization? A Critic of the Findings of the Dispute Settlement Body in European Communities—Conditions for
the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, 1 ASIAN J. WTO &
INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 465, 471 (2006) (“Due to the voluntary nature of GSP
schemes, political considerations most obviously dominate any donor’s willingness in granting such preferences.”).
188. See id. at 470–71 (“[T]he granting of such system is essentially a ‘gift’
from developed countries with the consequence that any tight limitation on
them will most likely put an end to the system altogether.”).
189. See, e.g., Moon, supra note 24, at 617 (“S&DT may be made stronger,
more effective and more operational.”).
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2. Comparison to GSP Plus Arrangements and Limiting the
Solution to LDCs
Despite potential concerns that the suggested modification
is too expansive and violates the MFN rule, the proposal is very
similar to GSP Plus, which lends legality to its enactment. GSP
Plus grants additional preferences on items not included in the
standard product coverage.190 It recognizes that the benefits
from standard trade preference programs are insufficient to
provide meaningful results, and hence attempts to improve
them by expanding product coverage.191 The proposed changes
similarly recognize flaws in the preference programs and attempt to expand the programs’ utilization. However, instead of
having broader product coverage, the proposed changes increase the personnel that focus on developing countries, which
can potentially expand product coverage as well as accomplish
other utilization-increasing measures.192 The changes increase
the attention paid to finding exporters and providing them with
valuable information and encouraging them through the exportation process.
While the proposed changes are not entirely comparable to
GSP Plus193 and, as a result, may conflict with the MFN rule,
the proposed solution should only be applied to LDCs. GSP
should offer heightened representation only to countries that
meet certain standards, such as those offered under GSP
Plus194 or LDCs. A more expansive coverage that extends to
countries beyond LDCs may violate the MFN rule.195 Regardless, the proposed changes recognize the need to take extra
measures for countries that need the most economic growth.196
Applying the proposed solution solely to LDCs strengthens
the legality of the program under international trade law.197
190. See Bartels, supra note 43, at 873–74 (discussing prescription drugs as
an exception to the standard product coverage).
191. See, e.g., id.
192. See Telephone Interview with Marideth Sandler, supra note 5.
193. GSP primarily provides economic incentives to LDCs in the form of
reduced tariffs. EUR. COMMISSION, supra note 48.
194. Bartels, supra note 43, at 871 (listing standards for countries seeking
to qualify for GSP Plus benefits).
195. See supra Part I.A (discussing the MFN rule that initially precluded
the possibility of giving trade benefits to developing countries until the global
community gradually accepted the idea).
196. See EUR. COMMISSION, supra note 48.
197. Cf. Marinberg, supra note 32, at 130, 143 (explaining that exceptional
circumstances including economic development may support S&DT).
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The suggested alterations expand the level of focus and attention to specific countries that the WTO deems truly in need of
aid to encourage utilization and profitability of the program.
3. The Lack of Results May Qualify as an Exceptional
Circumstance
The current failure of trade preference programs supports
the necessity of instituting the proposed changes because it exemplifies the programs’ incompetency to carry out its goals.198
Not only should something be done to help developing countries
industrialize, but open markets and global industrialization
promote key national interests.199 Increased competition means
U.S. consumers can purchase products at the best price.200 The
failure to industrialize developing countries, even after decades
of trade preferences,201 suggests that the goal is complex and
may qualify as an “exceptional circumstance” that requires a
new form of solution to produce results.202 If the situation is an
exceptional circumstance, developed countries may have a
greater chance at receiving a WTO waiver and getting programs with a different focus and strategy.203
The WTO grants waivers if there are exceptional circumstances.204 Despite the lack of concrete criteria, there are some
factors that likely weigh toward getting a waiver.205 One consideration is WTO precedent.206 If the United States received a
waiver solely because “the Andean nations need[ed] to expand
their trade and economies,” then the WTO should grant similar
waivers for all trade programs that want to “expand their trade
and economies.”207

198. See Leal-Arcas, supra note 1, at 346 (arguing that trade policies promoting greater economic integration would promote greater economic development and peace for all countries involved).
199. Id.
200. See Krugman, supra note 87.
201. Differential treatment was approved by the GATT in 1979. Enabling
Clause, supra note 37, at 203.
202. See Marinberg, supra note 32, at 143 (stating that the absence of alternatives, hardship, and lack of precedent are factors for determining “exceptional circumstances”).
203. See id.
204. Id. at 130, 133; Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 29, art. IX.
205. See generally Marinberg, supra note 32 (discussing what constitutes
“exceptional circumstances”).
206. See id. at 143.
207. See id. at 151 (explaining the reasoning behind creating ATPA).
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Another consideration is whether the proposal is an “urgent policy objective” that cannot be accomplished through other means.208 The idea of helping developing countries, the subsequent acceptance of S&DT within WTO principles, and the
program’s enactment all show that the world considers assistance urgent.209 Further, the developed countries’ strategy
seems incomplete since it has not met the objective.210 At the
very least, the ineffectiveness of the current programs shows
that the issue is complex and not easily solved, especially with
the current methods. The WTO must encourage a new strategy,
such as the proposed solution, in order to achieve results. The
WTO should grant a waiver to establish the proposed changes
because the established trade preference programs are not feasibly productive.
The current situation needs change to become a more effective trade preference program. This Note advocates changing
the role of the program to become the representative for exporters, which would make it more efficient and helpful to developing countries. A program that focuses more attention on the
specific needs of beneficiary countries by providing more information and marketing products may encourage more program
usage. Further, the proposed changes are compatible with existing trade law since they only provide S&DT to qualified developing countries. They are necessary because the current
programs attempting to help developing countries industrialize
are not efficient, and it is vital for international economic
growth to achieve that goal.
CONCLUSION
Trade preferences help developing countries industrialize
quicker by providing easier access to foreign markets. The
enacted programs, however, fall short of success. The flaws in
the current programs range from inadequate product coverage
to indifference toward burdensome initial costs. This Note sug208. Id. at 133 (suggesting that policy concerns are not “exceptional circumstances”). But see id. at 143 (suggesting that the unavailability of other
methods consistent with GATT principles may make something an “exceptional circumstance”).
209. See Leal-Arcas, supra note 1, at 346; Ochieng, supra note 11, at 374.
210. See GALLAGHER, supra note 31, at 15 (noting that trade preferences
have eroded over time); Bermann & Mavroidis, supra note 61, at 1 (explaining
that LDCs have seen their portion of world trade decline over time); Ochieng,
supra note 11, at 375–76 (discussing the fact that many LDCs are seeking
more S&DT provisions in global trade agreements).
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gests that trade preference programs should change their role
so the employees act as representatives for the exporters. Not
only should the employees actively seek out and encourage foreign exporters, but they should provide them with needed information and help them profit in the domestic marketplace. At
the least, the changes can be limited to LDCs, or even a narrower subset, so as to not violate the MFN rule. Overall, for
these programs to fruitfully exist, the solution demands more
resources. The need to produce results that assist developing
countries should outweigh any expense concern. If developed
countries enact the proposed solution, international trade will
be closer to reaching an efficiency that benefits all nations
through cheaper products, increased jobs, higher GDPs, and
less economic disparity.

